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INTRODUCTION
Animal advocates, like anyone who is trying to change the 
status quo, must confront complicated issues when determining the 
optimal approach to try to achieve their goals. Social-justice 
movements often have to consider whether to focus on changes that 
may make an immediate impact on the lives of individuals but may 
not address core problems within the current legal system. The 
central question of this Article is whether animal advocates should 
use the special status granted to service and assistance animals, due 
to their role in the lives of persons with disabilities, to try to confront 
the problem of breed-discriminatory legislation. 
This Article analyzes one of the many issues that animal 
advocates face when deciding where to focus their efforts. Part I of 
the Article provides a brief review of the theoretical divisions among 
animal advocates and discusses the application of two primary 
approaches to companion and assistance animal issues.1 Part II of the 
Article sets forth basic information regarding breed-discriminatory 
legislation, focusing on recent developments in this area of the law.2
Part III is the core of the Article, and it analyzes case and legislative 
law that addresses the intersection of service and assistance animals 
under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Fair 
Housing Act (FHA), and breed-discriminatory legislation.3 Part IV of 
the Article concludes by providing practical and theoretical 
considerations for animal advocates who are considering utilizing 
this avenue to attempt to improve the lives of animals and humans.4
                                                     
1. Infra notes 5-22 and accompanying text.  
2. Infra notes 23-56 and accompanying text.  
3. Infra notes 57-134 and accompanying text.  
4. Infra notes 135-65 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE “GREAT DIVIDE” IN ANIMAL ADVOCACY
A. General Theoretical Issues 
Just as with other social movements, the debate over the best 
way to address issues involving animal advocacy is extremely 
complex. The current legal status of nonhuman animals as personal 
property is at the heart of many discussions in the field.5 The status 
of animals as property leads to the generally accepted understanding 
that, currently, animals are protected only when it is in the interest of 
humans.6 Polls indicate a majority of people in the United States 
believe, at a minimum, animals “deserve some protection from harm 
and exploitation, but it is still appropriate to use them for the benefit 
of humans.”7 Commentators have suggested alternatives to the 
treatment of animals as property, and certainly, in some situations 
                                                     
5. Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend: The Moral 
and Legal Status of Companion Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 68 (2002) 
[hereinafter Huss, Valuing]. A discussion of the philosophical basis for the status of 
animals including historical views and religious traditions is beyond the scope of 
this Article. See PAUL WALDAU, ANIMAL RIGHTS WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 
56-73 (2011) (discussing philosophical arguments in the animal-advocacy 
movement); Huss, Valuing, supra, at 52-60 (providing a brief discussion of these 
issues). 
6. See, e.g., Gary L. Francione & Anna E. Charlton, Animal Advocacy in 
the 21st Century: The Abolition of the Property Status of Nonhumans, in ANIMAL 
LAW AND THE COURTS: A READER 7, 7 (Taimie L. Bryant, Rebecca J. Huss, David N. 
Cassuto eds., 2008) (discussing the fact that animal interests are only protected when 
it is economically beneficial for humans); see also Pia Lucidi et al., Ethotest: A New 
Model To Identify (Shelter) Dogs’ Skills as Service Animals or Adoptable Pets, 95 
APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 103, 103 (2005). The goal of this study appeared to be 
to provide a method to encourage the use of dogs otherwise confined to shelters to 
be removed from those facilities and trained for therapy work; however, ultimately 
the study referenced back to humans’ interest that the dogs had continued utility as 
service animals. Id. at 103 (stating that the “paucity of dogs dedicated to animal-
assisted therapy . . . for disabled people creates long waiting lists worldwide and 
compromises the health of the few certified animals by demanding too much work 
from them at times, thus jeopardizing their future as service dogs”).
7. Frank Newport, Post-Derby Tragedy, 38% Support Banning Animal 
Racing, GALLUP (May 15, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/107293/PostDerby-
Tragedy-38-Support-Banning-Animal-Racing.aspx. The survey found that 72% of 
persons polled within the United States agreed with that statement in 2008, 
compared to 71% in 2003. Id. Note that 25% of people agreed with the statement 
that “Animals deserve the exact same rights as people to be free from harm and 
exploitation.” Id.
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(such as anti-cruelty laws) at least certain animals are treated 
differently than other forms of personal property.8
The “great divide” in animal advocacy between abolitionists 
and welfarists is the subject of many scholarly works.9 An 
                                                     
8. E.g., David Favre, Living Property: A New Status for Animals Within 
the Legal System, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (2010) (proposing a new category 
of “living property” that would provide for the evolution of legal rights for some 
animals). Professor Favre has proposed other avenues to change the current legal 
system, including a system in which property ownership is retained but animals 
would be provided the status of “juristic persons.” David Favre, Equitable Self-
Ownership for Animals, 50 DUKE L.J. 473, 502 (2000). Under Professor Favre’s 
equitable-self ownership proposal the legal and equitable components of property as 
it relates to animals would be divided. Id. at 489-90. If an animal had equitable title, 
the legal title owner would remain responsible for the animal but would have an 
obligation to take the animal’s interests into account. Id. at 494-95. Professor Favre 
has also advocated for the “respectful use” of animals. David Favre, The Integration 
of the Ethic of the Respectful Use of Animals into the Law, 16 BETWEEN SPECIES 
166, 167 (2013). 
9. E.g., GARY L. FRANCIONE & ROBERT GARNER, THE ANIMAL RIGHTS 
DEBATE: ABOLITION OR REGULATION x-xii (2010) (setting forth the theories 
supporting animal rights (abolition) and animal protection (regulation is also 
referred to as new welfarism) and stating that “[t]he debate between abolition and 
regulation is at the center of modern animal advocacy”); KIM STALLWOOD, GROWL:
LIFE LESSONS, HARD TRUTHS, AND BOLD STRATEGIES FROM AN ANIMAL ADVOCATE
175-79 (2014) (discussing rights vs. welfare and regulation vs. abolition); Elizabeth 
L. DeCoux, Speaking for the Modern Prometheus: The Significance of Animal 
Suffering to the Abolition Movement, 16 ANIMAL L. 9, 9 (2009) (discussing the 
divide). A broader discussion of philosophical theories supporting animal rights and 
welfare is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., WALDAU, supra note 5, at   
173-88 (discussing some of the major figures and organizations in the animal rights 
movement); Taimie Bryant, Virtue Ethics and Animal Law, 16 BETWEEN SPECIES 
105, 106 (2013) (exploring the use of virtue ethics in the context of animal law); 
Huss, Valuing, supra note 5, at 60-68 (discussing some of the modern theories on 
animal rights). This divide is not limited to academic scholarship. For example, in 
the world of dog-breed-specific rescue, one commentator discusses the impact of 
different philosophies. ANDREI S. MARKOVITS & KATHERINE N. CROSBY, FROM 
PROPERTY TO FAMILY: AMERICAN DOG RESCUE AND THE DISCOURSE OF COMPASSION 
44-49 (2014) (dividing the groups into pragmatic and idealist and the individuals 
involved into dog people and pet people). The conclusion from the data cited in this 
book found that  
the typical (mostly female) person forming the backbone of the breed 
specific canine rescue movement explicitly rejects the world of animal 
rights advocates and dismisses animal liberation not only as unrealistic in 
its aims but also, worse still, detrimental to the very constituents it 
purports to help, namely the animals. 
Id. at 302; see also Jessica Greenebaum, “I’m Not an Activist!”: Animal Rights v. 
Animal Welfare in the Purebred Dog Rescue Movement, 17 SOC’Y & ANIMALS 289,
300-02 (2009) (reporting on results of a study of dog rescue volunteers and finding 
that most “do not associate with activism [or] the animal rights movement”).
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abolitionist would eliminate the use of animals by humans for any 
purpose.10 Traditionally, a welfarist theory does not challenge the 
status of animals as property, but focuses on the humane treatment of 
animals.11 An additional source of division among animal advocates 
is whether promoting incremental change is an acceptable strategy or 
whether allowing for such change is actually detrimental to the 
movement.12
B. Application of Theoretical Issues to Companion and Assistance 
Animals 
Often, deliberations over the use of animals do not focus on 
domestic animals acting as companions or assistance animals; 
however, some commentators have discussed the moral and ethical 
implications of the use of these animals.13 One commentator, after 
considering the research regarding nonhuman animals’ attributes, 
including, among other things, emotions, cognitive capacity, and 
culture, concluded that “[o]ur growing knowledge of animals brings 
profound obligations” and “[a]s it becomes clear that other animals 
                                                     
10. FRANCIONE & GARDNER, supra note 9, at 61, 103. 
11. DeCoux, supra note 9, at 17. 
12. FRANCIONE & GARDNER, supra note 9, at 61, 103. This book provides a 
debate between two authors with one of the authors (Francione) stating that 
“welfarists are wrong to say that abolitionists reject incremental change” but that 
“abolitionists reject regulatory change that seeks to make exploitation more 
‘humane’ or that reinforces the property status of animals.” Id. at 61. Professor 
Francione also sets forth the argument that contemporary welfarists’ campaigns 
reinforce the property status of animals and discusses the problems with single issue 
campaigns. Id. at 29-30, 75-79. The other author (Gardner) provides the viewpoint 
that an abolitionist perspective is fundamentalist in the sense that it is unwilling “to 
compromise those beliefs in order to achieve incremental short-term goals that fall 
short of the ideal end point.” Id. at 103. Professor Gardner also argues that a 
welfarist approach is not counterproductive. Id. at 104, 120-26; see also
STALLWOOD, supra note 9, at 175-79 (exploring the division between rights/welfare 
and abolition/regulation).  
13. See Rebecca J. Huss, Re-evaluating the Role of Companion Animals in 
the Era of the Aging Boomer, 47 AKRON L. REV. 497, 544-49 (2014) [hereinafter 
Huss, Aging] (discussing ethical issues relating to companion and assistance 
animals); see Leslie Irvine, Pampered or Enslaved? The Moral Dilemmas of Pets,
24 INT’L J. SOC. & SOC. POL’Y 5, 5 (2004) (discussing ethical issues regarding the 
keeping of companion animals); Tzachi Zamir, The Moral Basis of Animal-Assisted 
Therapy, 14 SOC’Y & ANIMALS 179, 180 (2006) (discussing ethical issues relating to 
animal-assisted therapy programs and service animals). 
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are more like us than not, we must reconsider our treatment of them, 
even that which appears benign.”14
Generally, an individual supporting the abolitionist perspective 
would argue it is essentially immoral to keep animals for 
companionship or as assistance animals.15 Abolitionist theory could 
support rescue and adoption efforts to care for domesticated animals 
currently in existence but would cease the breeding of these 
animals.16 Under an abolitionist theory, it would be almost 
impossible to structure a situation where a dog would appropriately 
be used as a service animal; though, as discussed below, it may be 
possible for an animal currently in existence to be cared for as a 
companion animal and still act in a way that provides assistance for 
an individual with a disability.17
Welfarists would generally allow for the keeping of companion 
and assistance animals with the focus on the appropriate treatment of 
the animals.18 For example, aversive training methods, which were 
very commonly used in the past, are now out of favor with many 
                                                     
14. Irvine, supra note 13, at 5, 14. 
15. Id. at 14 (concluding under the animal rights perspective it would be 
immoral to keep animals for humans’ pleasure).
16. Francione & Charlton, supra note 6, at 27. Under the abolitionist 
theory, keeping companion animals, as currently practiced, would eventually end. 
Irvine, supra note 13, at 14.  
17. Because the entire theory is based on the elimination of the use of 
animals by humans, it is consistent with abolitionist theory to focus on the needs of 
the individual animal; thus, unless it could be shown that an animal, such as a dog, 
benefited from the dog’s use as a service animal (other than the general benefits of 
having housing, food, veterinary care, etc.), it would be inappropriate to utilize the 
dog in this capacity. In theory, some animals may benefit from “having a job”; 
however, it would be challenging to ensure that the animal’s interest, rather than the 
human’s interest, is paramount. See, e.g., Kathy Antoniotti, Working Dogs Need Job 
to Occupy Them - Great Pyrenees Puzzles Owners With a Change in Conduct. They 
Learn Pet Needs a Challenge, AKRON BEACON, June 22, 2013, at E1 (discussing the 
need for a working dog to have intellectual stimulation). As discussed below, 
animals that are not individually trained to do work or perform tasks may fit within 
the definition of assistance animals under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA). Infra
notes 88-92 and accompanying text. Thus, in theory, keeping a currently existing 
animal (and not breeding animals for this purpose), in a situation where the role of 
the animal is essentially to merely be in the presence of an individual with a 
disability, could be consistent with some abolitionists’ views. Again, the challenge is 
to ensure that the animal’s interest is considered rather than the interest of the human 
with a disability. See SUE DONALDSON & WILL KYMLICKA, ZOOPOLIS: A POLITICAL 
THEORY OF ANIMAL RIGHTS 139-42 (2011) (discussing the use of animal labor, 
including the use of therapy animals).  
18. Irvine, supra note 13, at 11. 
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training professionals and would be of concern to a welfarist.19
Specific uses of service animals, such as partnering a service animal 
with an individual who may be unable to care for the animal or could 
injure an animal (inadvertently or otherwise) would also be of 
concern to welfarists.20 The necessity to plan for the retirement of a 
dog, given the fact that often dogs are not able to act in the role of 
service animals for the dog’s entire lifetime, would also be an 
example of the type of issue a welfarist would raise.21
It is important to consider the basic question of whether dogs 
should even be in the position of acting as companion or assistance 
animals; however, a discussion of these underlying ethical concerns 
is beyond the scope of this Article.22 Notwithstanding these ethical 
issues, it appears that society is widely accepting of the use of 
animals for these particular purposes at this time. 
II. THE ISSUE OF BREED-DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION
The reality is that there is a plethora of issues that need to be 
addressed in the animal-advocacy world. Certainly, from the 
perspective of the numbers of animals impacted, the treatment and 
consumption of farmed animals would be at the top of the list.23
However, given the very small percentage of people in the United 
                                                     
19. See, e.g., Mardi Richmond, Guide Dogs for the Blind, THE BARK,
http://thebark.com/content/guide-dogs-blind (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (discussing 
the transition from what would be considered aversive to positive reinforcement 
methods by Guide Dogs for the Blind beginning in 2006); James A. Serpell, 
Raymond Coppinger & Aubrey H. Fine, Welfare Considerations in Therapy and 
Assistance Animals, in HANDBOOK ON ANIMAL-ASSISTED THERAPY THEORETICAL 
FOUNDATIONS & GUIDELINES FOR PRACTICE 453, 466 (Aubrey H. Fine, ed. 2006) 
(discussing aversive training methods for assistance animals). 
20. Rebecca J. Huss, Canines in the Classroom: Service Animals in 
Primary and Secondary Educational Institutions, 4 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 11, 18-19
(2011) (discussing concerns over the placement of service animals with children on 
the autism spectrum). 
21. Nora Wenthold & Teresa Savage, Ethical Issues with Service Animals,
14 TOPICS STROKE REHABILITATION 68, 73-74 (2007).  
22. See Rebecca J. Huss, Why Context Matters: Defining Service Animals 
Under Federal Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1163, 1163-74 (2010) [hereinafter Huss, 
Context] (discussing the history, use, and ethical issues relating to service animals). 
23. David J. Wolfson & Mariann Sullivan, If It Looks Like a Duck . . . New 
Jersey, the Regulation of Common Farming Practices, and the Meaning of 
“Humane,” in ANIMAL LAW AND THE COURTS: A READER 94, 94 (Taimie L. Bryant, 
Rebecca J. Huss & David N. Cassuto eds., 2008) (stating that more than ten billion 
animals (excluding fish) are killed for food each year, representing over 98% of the 
animals with which humans have interaction).  
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States who identify themselves as vegans or vegetarians, garnering 
widespread support for change in the treatment of farmed animals 
(let alone the consumption of animals) is more than a little 
challenging.24  
Given that about two-thirds of United States households 
contain a companion animal, the treatment of this category of 
animals can be considered a more accessible issue for members of 
the public.25 Reports on the various types of abuse and neglect 
suffered by companion animals generate widespread attention by 
both social and traditional media.26 The recent decision by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation to include animal cruelty crimes in 
the agency’s National Incident-Based Reporting System also 
illustrates the importance placed on this type of treatment for certain 
animals.27 Some types of abuse of certain animals have resulted in 
                                                     
24. A recent study found that only 2% of the U.S. population would be 
considered to be vegetarian or vegan. HUMANE RES. COUNCIL, STUDY OF CURRENT 
AND FORMER VEGETARIANS AND VEGANS: INITIAL FINDINGS 2 (2014), 
https://faunalytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Faunalytics_Current-Former-
Vegetarians_Full-Report.pdf. This same study found that approximately 10% of the 
population identified as formerly following a vegetarian or vegan diet. Id. at 5. A 
2012 Gallup poll found that 5% of the U.S. population consider themselves to be 
vegetarian, with 2% of the U.S. population identifying themselves as vegan. Frank 
Newport, In U.S., 5% Consider Themselves Vegetarians, GALLUP, http://www. 
gallup.com/poll/156215/consider-themselves-vegetarians.aspx (last visited Oct. 25, 
2015). For some animal activists, vegan advocacy is of paramount concern. E.g.,
Corey Lee Wrenn & Rob Johnson, A Critique of Single-Issue Campaigning and the 
Importance of Comprehensive Abolitionist Vegan Advocacy, 16 FOOD, CULTURE &
SOC’Y 651, 665-66 (2013) (calling for animal advocates to cease single issue 
campaigns and challenge the underlying problems of speciesism by utilizing 
comprehensive vegan outreach).  
25. AM. PET PRODS. ASS’N, APPA NATIONAL PET OWNERS SURVEY 2013–
2014, at 3 (2013) (reporting survey results indicating that among online U.S. 
households the percentage of pet ownership is 68%, with dogs owned by 46.7% and 
cats owned by 37.3% of such households). 
26. Rebecca J. Huss, Lessons Learned: Acting as Guardian/Special Master 
in the Bad Newz Kennels Case, 15 ANIMAL L. 69, 71, 84-85 (2008) (discussing the 
media coverage in the Bad Newz Kennels dogfighting case); Conor Berry, FBI Adds 
Animal Cruelty Cases to National Crime Report as Social Media Helps Publicly 
Shame Abusers, MASSLIVE (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.masslive.com/news/index. 
ssf/2014/09/animal_cruelty.html (discussing the role of social media in putting 
pressure on government officials). 
27. E-mail from Drema Fouch, FBI UCR Program, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, to Debra Denslaw, Faculty Services Librarian & Associate Professor 
of Law Librarianship, Valparaiso University Law School (Sept. 25, 2014, 2:03 PM 
CST) (on file with author). Animal cruelty will be reported as a Group A Offense 
and a Crime Against Society. The four types of abuse will be simple/gross neglect, 
intentional abuse and torture, organized abuse (dog and cock fighting), and animal 
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federal legislation,28 and many animal-advocacy organizations have 
campaigns addressing the abuse of animals.29
The issue addressed in this Article is not the general concept of 
the use of animals, or even the treatment of companion animals, but 
the specific use of a certain breed of dog as an assistance or service 
animal by a person with a disability. This issue impacts animals on 
various levels. At the most basic level, keeping companion animals 
in their homes is an issue of great concern to animal advocates.30
Most of the laws relating to the treatment and keeping of 
companion animals are based in state and local law.31 Many 
                                                                                                               
sexual abuse. The change will be implemented in the National Incident-Based 
Reporting System in 2015, and data will begin to be accepted in January 2016. Id. 
Prior to this time, cruelty to animals was placed in the category of “all other 
offences.” CRIM. JUST. INFO. SERVS. DIVISION, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM (NIBRS) USER MANUAL 48 (2013), 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/nibrs-user-manual. 
28. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2012). After the 2010 Supreme Court case of 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010), found a previous law prohibiting 
the interstate sale of crush videos invalid, the U.S. Congress passed a new statute 
narrowing the scope that became effective in December 2010. 18 U.S.C. § 48. Crush 
videos are defined as various forms of an image that “depict[] actual conduct in 
which 1 or more living non-human mammals, birds, reptiles, or amphibians is 
intentionally crushed, burned, drowned, suffocated, impaled, or otherwise subjected 
to serious bodily injury.” Id. A 2014 case upheld the validity of the new crush video 
law. United States v. Richards, 755 F.3d 269, 279 (5th Cir. 2014).
29. E.g., Report Animal Cruelty, ANIMAL CRUELTY, https://www.aspca. 
org/fight-cruelty/report-animal-cruelty (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (setting forth the 
steps an individual should take if he or she suspects animal cruelty); Animal Abuse 
and Neglect, HUMANE SOC’Y U.S., http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/abuse_ 
neglect/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2015). 
30. Rebecca J. Huss, Rescue Me: Legislating Cooperation Between Animal 
Control Authorities and Rescue Organizations, 39 CONN. L. REV. 2059, 2066 (2007)
(setting forth three commonly utilized prongs for implementing non-lethal strategies 
in pet population control as “(a) increasing adoptions, (b) increasing sterilizations, 
and (c) increasing the retention of companion animals in homes”); see also AM.
HUMANE ASS’N, KEEPING PETS (DOGS AND CATS) IN HOMES: A THREE-PHASE 
RETENTION STUDY, PHASE II: DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF POST-ADOPTION RETENTION IN 
SIX SHELTERS IN THREE U.S. CITIES 4-5 (2013), http://www.americanhumane.org/ 
petsmart-keeping-pets-phase-ii.pdf (last accessed Jan. 9, 2015) (discussing a three-
phase study to better understand why people do not adopt animals and to determine 
effective strategies to prevent relinquishment to shelters); Webinars Archive: Pet 
Retention: Keeping Pets in Their Homes, BEST FRIENDS, http://nmhpnetwork. 
bestfriends.org/Webinars.aspx (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (discussing issues that 
impact pet relinquishment and retention in homes). 
31. DAVID S. FAVRE, ANIMAL LAW: WELFARE, INTEREST, AND RIGHTS 34-35
(2008) (stating “[i]n the United States, the governments of the individual states 
control ownership under property law concepts . . . [a]s such either the state courts 
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jurisdictions have passed laws regulating the species and number of 
animals that individuals may keep in their housing, regardless of the 
treatment of the animals.32 The standard used to determine whether 
this type of law is valid is whether the law is rationally related to the 
allowed concerns of the legislature.33 In the area of animal 
regulations, the concerns are generally related to public health, 
safety, or welfare.34 Just as with other local ordinances, a state or 
federal law may preempt the local ordinance.35
Breed-discriminatory ordinances restrict or ban the keeping of 
dogs within a jurisdiction based not on the behavior of the animal but 
the appearance of the dog.36 It is important to note that although these 
laws generally list a breed or breeds of dogs, the description is often 
based on the appearance of the dog and does not rely on DNA 
evidence.37 Recent studies have illustrated that visual identification 
                                                                                                               
or the state legislatures are fully empowered to deal with the issue of ownership of 
animals”).
32. Rebecca J. Huss, Companion Animals and Housing, in ANIMAL LAW 
AND THE COURTS: A READER 189-97 (Taimie L. Bryant, Rebecca J. Huss & David 
N. Cassuto eds., 2008) (analyzing state and local laws). For example, species 
restrictions may limit the animals that can be kept to certain domesticated animals 
that are widely considered companion animals, such as cats or dogs, but excluding 
animals such as potbellied pigs. Id. at 194-95. 
33. Id. at 190. 
34. Id.
35. Id. Note that in some states there is a concept of “home rule” that 
provides certain local municipalities with more control over these types of 
regulations. Id.; see also Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional 
Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1340-44, 1374 (2009) 
(setting forth the framework for home rule and providing an appendix of home rule 
provisions in the states in 2009); Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV.
1113, 1122-32 (2007) (discussing the development of home rule and the previously 
popular regime referred to as Dillon’s Rule, which provides that municipalities’ 
power is limited to what is granted to them by the state or necessary to their purpose 
of incorporation).  
36. A.B.A., Resolution, Adopted by the House of Delegates August 6-7, 
2012, 2012 AM 100, http://www.americanbar.org/directories/policy.html (search 
“pit bull”) at 1 [hereinafter A.B.A., Resolution] (stating that “[b]reed-discriminatory 
measures, sometimes referred to as breed-specific measures, distinguish dogs of one 
or more specific breeds . . . as inherently dangerous because of the dog’s physical 
appearance”).
37. Katie Bray Barnett, Breed Discriminatory Legislation: How DNA Will 
Remedy the Unfairness, 4 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 161, 161 (2011) (discussing the 
use of physical characteristics rather than DNA in ordinances). 
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of dogs is frequently inaccurate, even by persons observing dogs on 
a daily basis, such as shelter workers.38
Many national animal-advocacy organizations oppose breed-
discriminatory legislation, including the American Humane 
Association,39 American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals,40 Best Friends Animal Society,41 and the Humane Society 
of the United States.42 Other organizations with an interest in animals 
                                                     
38. Victoria L. Voith et al., Comparison of Visual and DNA Breed 
Identification of Dogs and Inter-Observer Reliability, 3 AM. J. SOC. RES., no. 2, 
2013, at 17, 18, 24 [hereinafter Voith, Comparison of Visual] (finding a “wide 
disparity between DNA and visual identification of the predominant breeds 
comprising a dog . . . indicat[ing] a low level of agreement among people regarding 
breed composition”); Victoria L. Voith et al., Comparison of Adoption Agency 
Breed Identification and DNA Breed Identification of Dogs, 12 J. APPLIED ANIMAL 
WELFARE SCI. 253, 261 (2009) (comparing DNA results with breed identification by 
adopting agencies).  
39. Press Release, Am. Humane Ass’n, American Humane Association 
Applauds President Obama for Joining Groups Opposed to Breed-Specific 
Legislation (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.americanhumane.org/about-us/newsroom/ 
news-releases/president-obama-breed-specific-legislation.html (referencing the 
White House response to a petition calling for a ban on breed specific legislation 
stating, “there is little evidence that supports breed-specific legislation as an 
effective means of reducing dog bites and dog attacks . . . [o]n the contrary, studies 
have shown that it is not the breeds themselves that are dangerous, but unfavorable 
situations that are creating dangerous dogs”).
40. Position Statement on Breed Specific Legislation, ASPCA, https://www. 
aspca.org/about-us/aspca-policy-and-position-statements/position-statement-on-
breed-specific-legislation (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (stating “the ASPCA is not 
aware of credible evidence that breed-specific laws make communities safer either 
for people or other companion animals . . .[t]here is, however, evidence that such 
laws unfairly target responsible pet guardians and their well-socialized dogs, are 
inhumane, and impede community safety and humane sheltering efforts”).
41. Pit Bull Terrier Initiatives, BEST FRIENDS, http://bestfriends.org/What-
We-Do/Our-Work/Initiatives/Pit-Bull-Terrier-Initiatives/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) 
(describing its initiative on pit bulls and stating “[b]ecause legislation targeting dogs 
by breed—instead of careless owners—has proved ineffective. . . [n]ot only do such 
laws infringe on basic rights, they fail to enhance public safety for people and pets”). 
42. Why Breed-Specific Legislation Doesn’t Work, HUMANE SOC’Y U.S.
(Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/breed-specific-legislation/fact_ 
sheets/breed-specific-legislation-flaws.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20150317 
20100/http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/breed-specific-legislation/fact_sheets/ 
breed-specific-legislation-flaws.html]. The Humane Society states:  
 The HSUS opposes laws and ordinances aimed at forbidding or 
regulating dog ownership based solely on breed or type of dog. Breed-
specific legislation (BSL) does not enhance public safety or reduce dog 
bite incidents. Rather, such laws, regulations, and ordinances are costly to 
enforce and harm families, dogs, and communities. 
Id. 
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and public health, such as the American Kennel Club,43 American 
Veterinary Medical Association,44 American Veterinary Society of 
Animal Behavior,45 Association of Professional Dog Trainers,46 and 
the National Animal Control Association47 also oppose legislation 
that deems a dog dangerous based on breed rather than behavior. 
Organizations that are not focused on the welfare of animals 
have also considered the issue of breed-discriminatory legislation. In 
2012, the American Bar Association48 (the largest national voluntary 
association of lawyers in the United States) adopted a policy calling 
for legislative bodies to enact comprehensive breed-neutral 
                                                     
43. AM. KENNEL CLUB, CANINE LEGISLATION POSITION STATEMENT 
“DANGEROUS DOG” CONTROL LEGISLATION, http://images.akc.org/pdf/canine_ 
legislation/position_statements/Dangerous_Dog_Control_Legislation.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2015) (stating “[t]he American Kennel Club strongly opposes any 
legislation that determines a dog to be ‘dangerous’ based on specific breeds or 
phenotypic classes of dogs”).
44. Dangerous Animal Legislation, AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, 
https://www.avma.org/KB/Policies/Pages/Dangerous-Animal-Legislation.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2015) (stating “[t]he AVMA supports dangerous animal legislation 
by state, county, or municipal governments provided that legislation does not refer 
to specific breeds or classes of animals. . . [t]his legislation should be directed at 
fostering safety and protection of the general public from animals classified as 
dangerous”); see Why Breed-Specific Legislation Is Not the Answer, AM.
VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, https://www.avma.org/public/Pages/Why-Breed-Specific-
Legislation-is-not-the-Answer.aspx (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (citing to a recent 
study that illustrated that observers’ identifications of breeds of dogs is often 
inconsistent, visual identification of breed is unreliable); see also Voith, Comparison 
of Visual, supra note 38, at 24 and accompanying text (discussing study finding a 
disparity between DNA results and visual identification of breeds). 
45. AM. VETERINARY SOC’Y ANIMAL BEHAVIOR, POSITION STATEMENT ON 
BREED-SPECIFIC LEGISLATION 1, http://avsabonline.org/uploads/position_statements/ 
Breed-Specific_Legislation-download-_8-18-14.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) 
(stating that the position of the organization is that breed-specific legislation “is 
ineffective, and can lead to a false sense of community safety as well as welfare 
concerns for dogs identified (often incorrectly) as belonging to specific breeds”).
46. Breed Specific Legislation, ASS’N PROF. DOG TRAINERS (2001),
http://www.apdt.com/about/ps/breed_specific_legis.aspx (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) 
(stating “[t]he APDT opposes any law that deems a dog as dangerous or vicious 
based on appearance, breed or phenotype. . . . [t]he only predictor of behavior is 
behavior”).
47. NAT’L ANIMAL CARE & CONTROL ASS’N, NACA GUIDELINES 25 (2014), 
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.nacanet.org/resource/resmgr/Docs/NACA_Guidelines.pdf 
(stating “[d]angerous and/or vicious animals should be labeled as such as a result of 
their actions or behavior and not because of their breed”).
48. About the American Bar Association, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (stating 
“[t[he American Bar Association is one of the world’s largest voluntary professional 
organizations, with nearly 400,000 members”).
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dangerous-dog/reckless-owner laws.49 In response to an online 
petition calling for a ban on breed-specific legislation at the end of 
2012, the White House official response referenced the community 
approach to dog-bite prevention advocated by the Centers for 
Disease Control (CDC) and stated that the White House doesn’t 
“support breed-specific legislation—research shows that bans on 
certain types of dogs are largely ineffective and often a waste of 
public resources.”50
Some organizations have campaigns targeting breed-
discriminatory legislation. An example is Best Friends Animal 
Society (Best Friends).51 One of Best Friends’ initiatives is focused 
on pit-bull-terrier-like dogs.52 Best Friends states: 
Pit bulls and pit bull mixes are the dogs most at risk of being killed in 
animal shelters around the country because of the sheer number of them 
and the negative stigma surrounding them. Best Friends is committed to 
changing the damaging public perception of pit bulls, who were once 
considered great family dogs.53
At the time of the writing of this Article, nineteen states had 
passed legislation restricting the ability of a local jurisdiction to 
enact breed-discriminatory legislation.54 One of the aspects of Best 
                                                     
49. A.B.A., Resolution, supra note 36. The Resolution states: 
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges all state, 
territorial, and local legislative bodies and governmental agencies to adopt 
comprehensive breed-neutral dangerous dog/reckless owner laws that 
ensure due process protections for owners, encourage responsible pet 
ownership and focus on the behavior of both dog owners and dogs, and to 
repeal any breed discriminatory or breed specific provisions. 
Id.; see also ABA Adopts Policy Based on Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Section 
Resolution Urging the Adoption of Breed-Neutral Dog Laws and the Repeal of 
Breed Discriminatory (Pit Bull) Ordinances, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 9, 2012), 
http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2013/08/aba_adopts_ 
policyba0.html. 
50. Breed-Specific Legislation Is a Bad Idea, WHITE HOUSE, https:// 
petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/ban-and-outlaw-breed-specific-legislation-bsl-
united-states-america-federal-level-0 (last visited Oct. 25, 2015). 
51. Our Work, BEST FRIENDS, http://bestfriends.org/what-we-do/our-work/ 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (listing pit bulls, puppy mills, and cats as initiatives the 
organization has to accomplish its mission to “SAVE THEM ALL”).
52. Pit Bull Terrier Initiatives, supra note 41.
53. Id. 
54. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 31683 (West 2014) (restricting local 
authorities from enacting breed-discriminatory ordinances other than ordinances 
relating to mandatory spay or neuter programs under certain circumstances); see 
also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 122330(c), 122331(a) (West 2014); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-9-204.5(5)(b) (2014); FLA. STAT. § 767.14 (2014); 510 ILL. COMP.
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Friends’ initiative regarding pit-bull-terrier-like dogs is to increase 
the number of states with similar legislation.55 Although there has 
been some success in eliminating breed-discriminatory legislation, it 
is still in place in many communities.56
III. THE APPLICATION OF BREED-DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION TO 
INDIVIDUALS UTILIZING SERVICE AND ASSISTANCE ANIMALS
Two federal laws that activists may utilize in ensuring access 
for persons with disabilities who have pit-bull-terrier-like dogs are 
the American with Disabilities Act57 and the Fair Housing Act.58
Recent interpretations of both laws provide strong arguments that a 
breed-discriminatory policy cannot be applied to prevent a person 
with a disability from being accompanied by his or her pit-bull-
terrier-like dog in public accommodations or housing.59
                                                                                                               
STAT. 5/24 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 347.51 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:19–36 (West 
2014); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 107(5) (McKinney 2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, 
§ 46(B) (2014); 3 PA. CONS. STAT. § 459-507-A(c) (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 40-34-16 (2014); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 822.047 (1) (West 2014); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 18-2-101 (2) (LexisNexis 2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.2-6540(C) 
(2014). 
55. Pit Bull Terrier Initiatives, supra note 41. 
56. Aamer Madhani, U.S. Communities Increasingly Ditching Pit Bull 
Bans, USA TODAY (Nov. 18, 2014, 1:10 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
news/nation/2014/11/17/pit-bulls-breed-specific-legislation-bans/19048719/ (stating 
that “[o]ver the past two years, more than 100 municipalities across the USA have 
overturned bans and other restrictions that target dogs in the pit bull family . . . .
[and] [m]ore communities could soon follow suit”).
57. See generally ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 
122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008 was passed to address concerns that case law had 
established an “inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to obtain coverage 
under the ADA.” Id.
58. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2012).
59. See infra notes 60-123 and accompanying text (discussing the 
application of the ADA and FHA). Note that although the cases discussed herein 
relate to issues with access with pit-bull-terrier-like dogs acting as service animals, 
there are certainly cases relating to access where the breed of the dog is not at issue. 
See, e.g., Alboniga v. Sch. Bd., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (ruling 
on a dispute relating to a service dog being utilized by a minor in a school 
environment whereby there was no mention of the dog being a Staffordshire terrier 
although media reports identified the dog’s breed); Carol Marbin, In Fight Over 
Boy’s Service Dog, Broward School Board Is Brought to Heel, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 
20, 2015), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article1078 
2953.html (identifying the breed of dog). 
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A. Americans with Disabilities Act and Service Animals 
The ADA is the comprehensive federal civil rights law 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability.60 Individuals 
with disabilities must be granted access to public entities under Title 
II61 and public accommodations under Title III of the ADA.62
The ADA requires that public entities (state and local 
governments) and public accommodations “shall modify policies, 
practices, or procedures to permit the use of a service animal by an 
individual with a disability.”63 Guidance to the rulemaking by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) clarified that the position of that agency 
is to reject the application of breed-discriminatory policies to service 
animals.64
The current ADA regulations include a definition of service 
animal.65 Service animal is defined as: “any dog that is individually 
trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual 
with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, 
intellectual, or other mental disability.”66
                                                     
60. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
61. See generally Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165. 
62. See generally Title III, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189. Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act provides, “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . .
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, . . . be denied the benefits of . . . any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) 
(2012). If applicable, Section 504 is utilized along with the ADA in service animal 
cases. 
63. 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(a) (2014). The language for public accommodations 
is substantially the same with the addition of the word “its.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c) 
(2014) (stating “shall modify its policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use 
of a service animal by an individual with a service animal by an individual with a 
disability”).
64. See infra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing guidance provided 
by the Department of Justice).  
65. Huss, Context, supra note 22, at 1174-79 (discussing the proposed ADA 
regulations). The regulatory language relating to the accommodation of service 
animals for public entities and public accommodations is essentially the same. See
28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 36.104. Although DOJ policy was clear that public entities 
were required to accommodate service animals, the regulations applicable to public 
entities prior to March 2011 did not include service animal language. 
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government 
Services, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,466, 34,477 (June 17, 2008) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 
35) (discussing the fact that although there was no specific language in the then-
current Title II regulation concerning service animals, those entities had the same 
legal obligations to make modifications as Title III entities). 
66. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104. The remainder of the definition is as follows: 
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The ADA’s intersection with breed-discriminatory ordinances 
is illustrated by the opinion granting a preliminary injunction in Sak 
v. City of Aurelia.67 Although the Sak case involved a local 
ordinance,68 its analysis is applicable to other scenarios involving 
accommodation under the ADA given the parallel language in the 
Title II and Title III regulations. Thus, if a restaurant, hotel, or other 
public accommodation had a breed-discriminatory company policy 
restricting the ability of a person with a disability to be accompanied 
by a service dog,69 such business would be in violation of the ADA 
according to this analysis. The Sak case is especially useful for 
advocates because it could be described as a case that has “good 
facts” and can serve as a model for future causes of action.70
                                                                                                               
Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or untrained, 
are not service animals for the purposes of this definition. The work or 
tasks performed by a service animal must be directly related to the 
individual’s disability. Examples of work or tasks include, but are not 
limited to, assisting individuals who are blind or have low vision with 
navigation and other tasks, alerting individuals who are deaf or hard of 
hearing to the presence of people or sounds, providing non-violent 
protection or rescue work, pulling a wheelchair, assisting an individual 
during a seizure, alerting individuals to the presence of allergens, 
retrieving items such as medicine or the telephone, providing physical 
support and assistance with balance and stability to individuals with 
mobility disabilities, and helping persons with psychiatric and 
neurological disabilities by preventing or interrupting impulsive or 
destructive behaviors. The crime deterrent effects of an animal’s presence 
and the provision of emotional support, well-being, comfort, or 
companionship do not constitute work or tasks for the purposes of this 
definition. 
Id. This language is mirrored in regulations applicable to Title III of the ADA. 28 
C.F.R. § 36.104. Although not relevant to this Article’s discussion regarding breed-
discriminatory legislation, the regulations also require entities to make reasonable 
accommodations to permit the use of a miniature horse as a service animal subject to 
several assessment factors. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.136(i), 36.302(c)(9). 
67. 832 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1031 (N.D. Iowa 2011). 
68. Id. at 1038-39, 1042 (discussing the applicability of Title II of the ADA, 
stating that “[t]here does not appear to be any dispute that the City of Aurelia is a 
‘public entity,’” and reiterating a prior holding that “the regulation of any activity by 
a city, by an ordinance, is, itself, a program, service, activity, or benefit of the City 
that Title II of the ADA will reach”).
69. Absent the ability to restrict service dogs that are disruptive as 
discussed below. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
70. United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d. 336, 337 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating in a 
criminal case “[l]awyers and judges are familiar with the well-worn adage that bad 
facts make bad law . . . [a] possible corollary to this proposition is that good facts 
make good law”); see also Thomas Saunders, Settling Without “Settling”: School 
Finance Litigation and Governance Reform in Maryland, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
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1. The Person Utilizing the Dog Must Be a Qualified 
Individual with a Disability 
In order for the ADA to be applicable, a person must fit within 
the definition of a qualified individual with a disability.71 Disability 
is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities.”72 Mr. Sak, a retired Chicago 
police officer and veteran,73 had suffered a stroke leaving him 
permanently disabled.74 Mr. Sak utilized a wheelchair and had no 
control over the right side of his body.75 The Sak court found that 
“[t]here does not appear to be any dispute that . . . Sak is a ‘qualified 
individual with a disability’ within the meaning of Title II of the 
ADA.”76
One of the challenges for entities subject to the ADA in 
determining whether an individual is covered by the law is that 
regulations make it clear that entities may not inquire “about the 
nature or extent of a person’s disability” but are only allowed to “ask 
if the animal is required because of a disability and what work or 
task the animal has been trained to perform.”77 In Mr. Sak’s case, his 
                                                                                                               
571, 613 (2004) (citing to Susan Goering explaining the litigation strategy in a 
school financing case as “[w]e followed the old adage that good facts make good 
law. . . [a]s an attorney, you take your best case and the most compelling facts you 
have for a case of first impression” (quoting Interview with Susan Goering, Exec. 
Dir., ACLU of Md., in Balt., Md. (Jan. 23, 2003))). 
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012). 
72. Id. Major life activities are defined as  
(A) In general. For purposes of paragraph (1), major life activities include, 
but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, 
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, 
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and 
working. 
(B) Major bodily functions. For purposes of paragraph (1), a major life 
activity also includes the operation of a major bodily function, including 
but not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, 
digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, 
endocrine, and reproductive functions.  
Id. (emphases omitted). 
73. Note the reference to “good facts” above. Mr. Sak was what might be 
referred to as a particularly sympathetic plaintiff. Not only was he a veteran and a 
former police officer, but he moved with his wife to the City of Aurelia to care for 
his elderly mother-in-law. Sak, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 1031. 
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1039. 
77. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.136(f), 36.302(c)(6) (2014). 
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disability was open and apparent; however, many persons with 
disabilities utilizing service animals may not “appear” disabled.78 An 
example would be an individual with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) utilizing a service animal.79 Such an individual may not have 
any obvious visible signs of his or her disability, but may be utilizing 
a psychiatric service animal. 
2. The Dog Must Meet the Definition of Service Animal Under 
the ADA Regulations 
Individual training to “do work or perform tasks” is the key to 
whether a dog meets the definition of service animal.80 Mr. Sak’s dog 
Snickers had been a family pet prior to his stroke.81 After the stroke, 
Mr. Sak’s physical therapist trained Snickers to assist Mr. Sak with 
walking, balance, and retrieving items.82
Although Mr. Sak obtained documentation that stated that 
Snickers was a “certified service animal,” the ADA regulations 
further provide that entities “shall not require documentation, such as 
proof that the animal has been certified, trained, or licensed as a 
service animal.”83 The Sak court found that the evidence provided in 
support of the Saks’ motion “demonstrates that Snickers has been 
individually trained to do work and to perform tasks for Sak that are 
directly related to his disability.”84
Regardless of a dog’s breed, if the dog has the appropriate 
temperament and skill set, the dog could be individually trained to do 
                                                     
78. Huss, Context, supra note 22, at 1176-79 (discussing concerns about 
distinguishing between psychiatric service animals that are covered under the ADA 
with emotional support animals that are not covered by the ADA).  
79. Joan Froling, Service Dog Tasks for Psychiatric Disabilities: Tasks to 
Mitigate Certain Disabling Illnesses Classified as Mental Impairments Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, INT’L ASS’N OF ASSISTANCE DOG PARTNERS 
(IAADP), available at http://www.iaadp.ord/psd_tasks.html (last visited Oct. 25, 
2015) (listing PTSD as a disabling condition that would be recognized by the ADA). 
80. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (providing the definition of 
service animal). 
81. Sak, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 1031-32 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.104). 
82. Id.
83. 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(f); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(6). Mr. Sak obtained this 
documentation from the National Service Animal Registry, even though such 
certification is not required by the ADA regulations. Sak, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 1032. 
The National Service Animal Registry is not affiliated with any governmental 
authority. NAT’L SERV. ANIMAL REGISTRY, About Us, http://nsarco.com/ 
aboutus.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2015). 
84. Sak, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.  
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work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a 
disability. In fact, at least one organization is focusing on training 
pit-bull-terrier-like dogs rescued from shelters to act as service 
dogs.85
3. An Entity Must Make a Reasonable Accommodation 
The DOJ’s guidance to the ADA regulations specifically 
addresses the issue of whether an entity may need to make an 
exception to a breed-discriminatory ordinance or policy. 
The Department does not believe that it is either appropriate or consistent 
with the ADA to defer to local laws that prohibit certain breeds of dogs 
based on local concerns that these breeds may have a history of 
unprovoked aggression or attacks. Such deference would have the effect 
of limiting the rights of persons with disabilities under the ADA who use 
certain service animals based on where they live rather than on whether 
the use of a particular animal poses a direct threat to the health and safety 
of others. Breed restrictions differ significantly from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. . . . [E]ntities have the ability to determine, on a case-by-case 
basis, whether a particular service animal can be excluded based on that 
particular animal’s actual behavior or history—not based on fears or 
generalizations about how an animal or breed might behave. This ability to 
exclude an animal whose behavior or history evidences a direct threat is 
sufficient to protect health and safety.86
ADA regulations provide that entities may exclude a service 
animal from the premises if “[t]he animal is out of control and the 
animal’s handler does not take effective action to control it.”87 In the 
                                                     
85. See Sue Manning, Rescued Pit Bulls Fight Stigma by Guiding People in 
Need (Feb. 11, 2015, 4:55 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/rescued-pit-bulls-fight-
stigma-guiding-people-174449009.html (discussing the Assistance Dog Training 
Program at the Animal Farm Foundation training service dogs and another 
organization training pit-bull-terrier-like dogs for emotional support); see also
ANIMAL FARM FOUND., ASSISTANCE DOG TRAINING PROGRAM, http://www. 
animalfarmfoundation.org/pages/Assistance-Dog-Program (last visited Oct. 25, 
2015). 
86. Title II Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,194 (Sept. 15, 2010); Title 
III Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,266, 56,268 (Sept. 15, 2010). Nondiscrimination on 
the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 
56,164, 56,216 (Sept. 15, 2010) (implementing the final regulation for Title II of the 
ADA and providing guidance on changes in the regulations); Nondiscrimination on 
the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 75 
Fed. Reg. 56,236, 56,306 (Sept. 15, 2010) (implementing the final regulations for 
Title III of the ADA and providing guidance on changes in the regulations). 
87. 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(b)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(2)(i). The animal can 
also be excluded if he or she is not housebroken. 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(b)(2); 28 
C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(2)(ii).  
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Sak case, Snickers was described as a “pit bull mix.”88 At the time of 
the hearing, Snickers was five and one-half years old and had no 
history of aggression.89 The City of Aurelia had an ordinance that 
made it unlawful to keep or in any way possess a “Pit Bull Dog”
within the city, and Mr. Sak did not dispute that Snickers would fall 
within the definition of a “Pit Bull Dog.”90
After the city directed the Saks to remove Snickers from the 
jurisdiction, the Saks brought a complaint requesting injunctive relief 
to prevent the city from enforcing the ordinance.91 The court first 
established that Title II of the ADA would apply in that there was no 
dispute that the city was a “public entity.”92 The court also reviewed 
the regulations in the ADA specifically requiring public entities to 
accommodate service animals.93
In finding that Mr. Sak had shown a likelihood of success on 
his claim that the city was violating the ADA through the application 
of the ordinance, the judge quoted the ADA regulations’ guidance 
and enjoined the city from applying the ordinance against Snickers.94
Of specific note, the judge ended his opinion by stating that “[t]his is 
one small, but vital step for Sak, one giant leap for pit bull service 
dogs.”95
The Sak case did not go to trial on the merits. The City of 
Aurelia executed a Release and Settlement Agreement in June 2012, 
allowing the Saks to keep Snickers in the city throughout both Mr. 
Sak’s and his wife’s lifetimes. The Saks agreed to keep or erect an 
eight-foot fence around their yard and keep Snickers on a leash if 
outside their property, and the city paid the Saks $30,000.96
As illustrated by the Sak case, the ADA can be used by 
individuals with pit-bull-terrier-like service dogs to assert rights of 
accommodation and access; however, if applicable, the FHA 
provides an alternative with broader coverage for persons with 
disabilities who utilize assistance animals. 
                                                     
88. Sak, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 1031. 
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1033. 
91. Id. at 1037. 
92. Id. at 1039. 
93. Id. at 1041. 
94. Id. at 1044, 1047. 
95. Id. at 1048.  
96. Release and Settlement Agreement Among James Sak, Peggy Leifer 
and the City of Aurelia (June 27, 2012) (on file with author).  
A Conundrum for Animal Activists 1581 
B. Fair Housing Act 
The FHA was part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.97 The Fair 
Housing Amendments Act was enacted in 1988 expanding the FHA 
to include persons with disabilities in the classes of persons protected 
from housing discrimination.98 The DOJ and the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) are jointly responsible for 
enforcing the FHA99 with HUD being responsible for the 
administration of the FHA.100 Similar to the expansive coverage of 
the ADA, the FHA covers a wide range of housing, including single-
family homes in some circumstances.101
Also similar to the ADA, plaintiffs may prove discrimination 
under the FHA by showing a failure to provide a reasonable 
accommodation.102 The FHA’s definition of discrimination includes 
refusing “to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, 
practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary 
                                                     
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2012); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 14 
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, at 2176 (discussing the background 
and need for the FHA). 
98. 42 U.S.C. § 3601; see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 17, reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179 (discussing the need for an amendment to the FHA 
to protect them). The FHA originally provided protection from discrimination in 
housing on the basis of race, color, national origin, or gender. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a). 
The FHA is sometimes referred to as the Fair Housing Amendments Act. References 
in this Article to the FHA include the FHA as amended by the Fair Housing 
Amendments Act. The FHA actually utilizes the term “[h]andicap” rather than
disabled, and it is defined as someone with “(1) a physical or mental impairment 
which substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life activities, (2) a 
record of having such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an 
impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). Many of the cases in this area of the law use the 
terms “handicap” and “disability” interchangeably. See, e.g., Giebeler v. M & B 
Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the use of the terms 
“handicap” and “disability”).
99. See U.S. DEP’T JUST. & U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., JOINT 
STATEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER THE FAIR 
HOUSING ACT 1 (2004), http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/library/huddojstatement.pdf. 
100. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a). The Attorney General or private persons may 
enforce the FHA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3613-14. 
101. Although many of the cases discussing the applicability of the FHA 
deal with multifamily dwellings, under many circumstances single-family homes are 
also included under the purview of the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1). 
102. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). 
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to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a 
dwelling.”103
Case law and language in federal regulations104 have 
established that a reasonable accommodation may include a waiver 
of a no-pet rule to allow for an assistance animal.105 There is no 
definition of assistance animal in the regulations; however, HUD has 
provided guidance.106 HUD included the following definition of 
“assistance animals” in one of its handbooks:
Assistance animals are not pets. They are animals that work, provide 
assistance, or perform tasks for the benefit of a person with a disability, or 
animals that provide emotional support that alleviates one or more 
identified symptoms or effects of a person’s disability. . . .
. . . Some, but not all, animals that assist persons with disabilities are 
professionally trained. Other assistance animals are trained by the owners 
themselves and, in some cases, no special training is required. The 
question is whether or not the animal performs the disability-related 
assistance or provides the disability-related benefit needed [as a 
reasonable accommodation] by the person with the disability.107
HUD’s position on assistance animals was also established in 
rulemaking in connection with the law that applies to pet ownership 
in HUD-assisted housing for the elderly and persons with 
disabilities.108 In the guidance on that rulemaking, HUD referenced 
its position in the handbook set forth above109 and reiterated its 
longstanding position, under the FHA, on the use of assistive 
animals—also referred to as “service animals,” “support animals,”
                                                     
103. Id. There are differences between the coverage of the ADA and FHA. 
For example, the FHA requires that the public and common use portions of 
multifamily dwellings constructed after January 1, 1991, must be handicapped 
accessible; however, any reasonable modifications within the unit are at the expense 
of the disabled person. 24 C.F.R. § 100.203 (2014). This is in contrast to the 
Americans with Disabilities Act provision that requires the person with the public 
accommodation to pay for any reasonable accommodations. 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12111(9),12111(10)(B). 
104. 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b) (providing an example of a blind applicant with 
a seeing-eye dog). 
105. See Rebecca J. Huss, No Pets Allowed: Housing Issues and Companion 
Animals, 11 ANIMAL L. 69, 75-88 (2005) [hereinafter Huss, No Pets Allowed]
(analyzing cases discussing waivers of no-pet rules). 
106. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.201. 
107. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., HUD HANDBOOK 4350.3:
OCCUPANCY REQUIREMENTS OF SUBSIDIZED MULTIFAMILY HOUSING PROGRAMS 2-41 
(2013), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=43503HSGH.pdf. 
108. Huss, Aging, supra note 13, at 513-17 (2014) (analyzing the law 
applying to assisted rental housing for the elderly or disabled). 
109. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (defining assistance animal). 
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“assistance animals,” or “therapy animals.”110 HUD articulated 
reasons why the FHA must cover “emotional support animals” and 
other animals that may not need training, stating “the needs of 
persons with disabilities in the housing arena are distinct from other 
settings.”111
HUD’s administrative decisions support an expansive 
definition of assistance animal.112 Although courts interpreting the 
FHA have not always been consistent in defining assistance 
animal,113 it is clear at this point in time that the definition of 
assistance animal under the FHA is broader than that of service 
animal under the ADA and clearly covers emotional support 
animals.114
A person requesting a reasonable accommodation under the 
FHA may be required by the housing provider to supply medical 
records to support the status of the individual as a person with a 
disability and to demonstrate that the animal is needed for the 
                                                     
110. Pet Ownership for the Elderly and Persons with Disabilities, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 63834, 63835 (Oct. 27, 2008) [hereinafter Pet Ownership for the Elderly and 
Disabled]. 
111. Id. at 63837. Although the focus in this Article is on dogs, there is no 
species limitation in the FHA definition of assistance animals; although, it is likely 
that a housing provider could limit its accommodation to common household 
domesticated animals. Rebecca J. Huss, Canines on Campus: Companion Animals 
at Postsecondary Educational Institutions, 77 MO. L. REV. 417, 439-40 (2012) 
(discussing the lack of a species restriction under the FHA definition of assistance 
animal). 
112. In many situations, tenants have been successful in arguing that there 
should be a waiver of a no-pet rule in order for the tenant to be able to retain an 
assistance animal. See Huss, No Pets Allowed, supra note 105, at 81 n.112 and 
accompanying text (discussing HUD consent orders). In states that have laws that 
are at least as protective as the federal law protecting against discrimination, at 
HUD’s discretion, the cases are referred to the applicable state division of human 
rights. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f) (2012). 
113. See Huss, No Pets Allowed, supra note 105, at 74-85 (analyzing FHA 
cases). 
114. Fair Hous. of the Dakotas, Inc. v. Goldmark Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 778 F. 
Supp. 2d 1028, 1036 (D.N.D. 2011) (stating that “the FHA encompasses all types of 
assistance animals regardless of training, including those that ameliorate a physical 
disability and those that ameliorate a mental disability”); Overlook Mut. Homes, Inc. 
v. Spencer, 415 F. App’x. 617, 622-23 (6th Cir. 2011) (discussing the definition of 
assistance dogs under the FHA and acknowledging that it was somewhat unclear at 
the time the litigation was initiated, but emphasizing that rather than utilizing the 
court process, housing providers should cooperate with residents over reasonable 
accommodation disputes). 
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individual to use and enjoy the premises.115 It is not uncommon for 
individuals to have to educate housing providers and others subject 
to the FHA as to the ability to keep an assistance animal in housing 
that would otherwise ban such animal.116
A recent example of the application of the FHA in the context 
of an individual with a pit-bull-terrier-like dog is the case of Warren 
v. Del Vista Towers Condominium Ass’n, Inc.117 To prevail on a FHA 
failure-to-accommodate claim, the plaintiff must show (a) that he or 
she is disabled within the meaning of the FHA; (b) the individual 
requested a reasonable accommodation; (c) such accommodation is 
necessary to use and enjoy the individual’s dwelling; and (d) the 
defendant refused to make the accommodation requested.118 In the 
Warren case, the condominium association conceded, for purposes 
of a motion for summary judgment, that Mr. Warren had met all the 
requirements for making a reasonable accommodation request.119 The 
only challenge that the condominium association asserted was that 
the requested accommodation was unreasonable.120 Specifically, the 
condominium association argued that allowing for an emotional 
support dog that allegedly fell within the terms of local breed ban 
would be per se unreasonable.121
                                                     
115. Huss, No Pets Allowed, supra note 105, at 74-82 (discussing the nexus 
between the disability and the assistance animal and the provision of medical 
records to support the request). A HUD consent order limited a housing provider’s 
ability to require medical records beyond a statement from a medical provider that 
the individual has a disability, and the designated animal provides emotional support 
or other assistance that alleviates one or more symptoms or effects of the person’s 
disability. HUD v. Carter, No. 11-F-077-FH-36, 2011 WL 7064545, at *4, *8, 
(H.U.D.A.L.J. Dec. 13, 2011). 
116. See, e.g., Susan Marschalk Green, Marley Comes Home, TAMPA BAY 
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, at 1 (discussing a case where a sixty-five-year-old woman with 
cancer and depression was not allowed to have her seventy-pound emotional support 
animal in her condominium due to a weight restriction and the condominium board’s 
eventual agreement to allow the dog after an attorney was hired to raise the FHA 
issue); Pilar Ulibarri, Dog Owner Files Lawsuit to Keep Canine in Condo, PALM 
BEACH POST, June 19, 2004, at 3C (reporting on case of a seventy-six-year-old man 
who successfully sued to keep his dog in his condominium and an eighty-five-year-
old woman who filed a lawsuit to allow her to keep her dog in her condominium). 
117. 49 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1084 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 
118. Id. at 1085-86; see also Huss, No Pets Allowed, supra note 105, at     
74-82 (discussing the nexus between the disability and assistance animal). 
119. Warren, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 1086.  
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1088. The court initially established that emotional support dogs 
are reasonable accommodations under the FHA. Id. at 1087. In this case, the 
condominium association did not allege that allowing Mr. Warren to have an 
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The Warren court reiterated it was not important that the dog 
(Amir) was not individually trained, but instead focused on the 
ability to deny a reasonable accommodation request for an assistance 
animal if the “animal’s behavior poses a direct threat and its owner 
takes no effective action to control the animal’s behavior so that the 
threat is mitigated or eliminated.”122 The Warren court found the 
presumption in favor of a reasonable accommodation under the FHA 
“requires the existence of a significant risk—not a remote or 
speculative risk.”123 The Warren court further cited to a HUD notice 
that allowed for a request for accommodation of an assistance animal 
to be denied if  
“(1) the specific assistance animal in question poses a direct threat to the 
health or safety of others that cannot be reduced or eliminated by another
reasonable accommodation, or (2) the specific assistance animal in 
question would cause substantial physical damage to the property of others 
that cannot be reduced or eliminated by another reasonable 
accommodation.”124  
                                                                                                               
assistance animal would “(1) impose an undue burden on the housing provider nor 
(2) fundamentally alter the nature of the provider’s operations.” Id. at 1086. The 
Warren court acknowledged that there was a dispute over Amir’s breed but stated it 
was immaterial to the case due to the FHA’s preemption of the ordinance. Id. at 
1089. 
122. Id. (quoting Schwartz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1220 
(11th Cir. 2008)). The Schwartz case analyzed issues relating to the application of a 
zoning ordinance to halfway houses for individuals recovering from substance 
abuse. Schwartz, 544 F.3d at 1205. 
123. Warren, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 1087 (quoting Pet Ownership for the Elderly 
and Disabled, 73 Fed. Reg. 63834, 63837 (Oct. 27, 2008)). Those rules continue 
with the following language:  
 The determination of whether an assistance animal poses a direct 
threat must rely on an individualized assessment that is based on objective 
evidence about the specific animal in question, such as the animal’s 
current conduct or a recent history of overt acts. The assessment must 
consider the nature, duration, and severity of the risk of injury; the 
probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether 
reasonable modifications of rules, policies, practices, procedures, or 
services will reduce the risk. In evaluating a recent history of overt acts, a 
provider must take into account whether the assistance animal’s owner has 
taken any action that has reduced or eliminated the risk. Examples would 
include obtaining specific training, medication, or equipment for the 
animal. 
Pet Ownership for the Elderly and Disabled, 73 Fed. Reg. at 63837. 
124. Warren, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 1087-88 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING &
URB. DEV., SERVICE ANIMALS AND ASSISTANCE ANIMALS FOR PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES IN HOUSING AND HUD-FUNDED PROGRAMS 3 (2013), https://portal. 
hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=servanimals_ntcfheo2013-01.pdf). 
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Because the issue of whether Amir posed a direct threat that could 
not be mitigated by another reasonable accommodation is a question 
of fact, the court declined to decide the issue of whether allowing 
Mr. Warren to keep Amir was a reasonable accommodation.125
The Warren court did consider whether the local ordinance 
banning pit bulls would make Mr. Warren’s request unreasonable per 
se.126 The Warren court considered the issue of whether the FHA 
preempted the local ordinance.127 The Warren court cited to a First 
Circuit Court of Appeals case, finding that “Section 3615 of the FHA 
preempts any law which permits a discriminatory housing 
practice.”128 Thus, the court held that as a matter of law, in this 
context, the local breed-discriminatory ordinance would be 
preempted by the FHA.129 The remaining issue was whether the dog 
“poses a direct threat to members of the condominium association, 
and whether that threat can be reduced by other reasonable 
accommodations.”130
After the summary judgment motion was denied, the parties in 
the Warren case agreed to a settlement providing that all the claims 
would be released if Mr. Warren would maintain a liability insurance 
policy for any injury or property damage caused by his dog Amir, 
and in exchange, Mr. Warren would be permitted to keep Amir at his 
residence and would receive $100,000 from the condominium 
association.131
In August 2015, a district court in Texas cited to the Warren
case and a HUD Notice dated April 25, 2013 that states that “[b]reed, 
size, and weight limitations may not be applied to an assistance 
animal” in denying a motion to dismiss a claim based on the FHA.132
The landlord in the Chavez v. Aber case asserted that because the dog 
being utilized as an emotional support animal (Chato) was part pit 
bull “[a]s a matter of law, it is not a reasonable accommodation to 
keep [such] a dangerous dog on the premises.”133 The Chavez court 
                                                     
125. Id. at 1088. 
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1089. 
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. E-mail from Marcy LaHart, Attorney for Paul Warren, to author (Jan. 
16, 2015, 5:10 PM CST) (on file with author).  
132. Chavez v. Aber, No. EP-15-CV-00068-KC, 2015 WL 4724807, at *11 
n.7 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2015) (quoting Reply to Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ 
First Amended Motion to Dismiss at 4). 
133. Id. at *11. 
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utilized an analysis similar to the Warren court to determine whether 
Chato was a direct threat and found that the plaintiffs had alleged 
sufficient facts to show that Chato did not pose such a threat and 
could be a potentially reasonable accommodation.134 These two 
recent cases and supporting HUD materials make it clear that the 
breed of a dog should not be a factor in determining whether an 
assistance animal is able to be excluded from housing.  
IV. CONSIDERATIONS FOR ANIMAL ADVOCATES
A. Practical Concerns—Appropriate Use of the Laws 
Just as with any other legal action, an advocate must be 
cautious in his or her use of the laws protecting persons with 
disabilities to ensure that the laws are utilized appropriately. This 
Section of the Article discusses some of the issues that should be 
considered. 
1. Perception of Widespread Misrepresentation of Status of 
Animals 
In connection with the revision of the ADA regulations, several 
commentators raised concerns with public accommodations being 
unable to distinguish between the use of service animals (covered by 
the ADA) and emotional support animals or pets.135 As discussed 
above, entities cannot require that service dogs be certified,136 and the 
ADA regulations limit entities from inquiring about the use of the 
service dog other than asking whether “the animal is required 
because of a disability and what work or tasks the animal has been 
                                                     
134. Id.
135. Huss, Context, supra note 22, at 1179. 
136. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. Note that this does not mean 
that entities do not sell “registration” or “certification” materials for service and 
assistance animals. See SERVICEDOGVEST.COM, http://www.servicedogvest.com/ 
vestaccessories.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (selling a service dog ID badge and 
tags with language stating that “access required”); Patches,
WORKINGSERVICEDOG.COM, http://www.workingservicedog.com/service_dog_ 
patches.aspx (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (selling service dog vests and patches, 
including patches that identify the type of disability such as PTSD or autism the 
service dog is being used to alleviate).  
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trained to perform.”137 Entities are specifically not allowed to inquire 
about the “nature or extent of a person’s disability.”138
Though it is impossible to quantify, concerns have been raised 
in the media and elsewhere that there may be a growing problem 
with some people misrepresenting the status of their pets as service 
or assistance animals.139 Businesses are concerned about persons 
using “fake” service dogs to obtain access to premises.140 In addition, 
persons with disabilities are reporting that they are having more 
problems when utilizing their service animals, and some attribute 
this to persons without disabilities who are trying to “pass off” their 
untrained companion animals as service animals.141
There is no specific language in the ADA or its regulations 
specifying a penalty for misrepresentation of an animal as a service 
animal.142 This is consistent with the legislative history of the ADA 
focusing on providing access for individuals with disabilities.143
                                                     
137. 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(f) (2014); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(6). 
138. 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(f); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(6). 
139. See, e.g., Illegal Fake Service Dogs Post Dangers to Many, CBS NEWS,
(Oct. 11, 2013, 11:13 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/illegal-fake-service-
dogs-pose-dangers-to-many/; Ian Parker, Fake Service Animals Is “Very 
Frustrating” Issue, Store Says, KATU.COM, (May 2, 2014, 10:19 AM), http://www. 
katu.com/news/local/Pushing-back-against-fake-service-animals-257595691.html; 
Rachel Swan, Loopholes in ADA Law Make “No Pets” Clauses Nearly Impossible 
to Enforce, EAST BAY EXPRESS, (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/ 
oakland/loopholes-in-ada-law-make-no-pets-clauses-nearly-impossible-to-enforce/ 
Content?oid=3301049; Scott Thistle, Increase in Registered Service Dogs in Maine, 
but Are Some Impostors?, BDN MAINE (Oct. 20, 2013, 6:16 AM), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2013/10/20/news/increase-in-registered-service-dogs-
in-maine-but-are-some-impostors/; CAL. SENATE BUS., PROFESSIONS & ECON. DEV.
COMMITTEE, FAKE SERVICE DOGS, REAL PROBLEM OR NOT?: HEARING ON THE 
POSSIBLE USE OF FAKE SERVICE DOGS AND FAKE IDENTIFICATION BY INDIVIDUALS TO 
OBTAIN SPECIAL ACCESS TO HOUSING, PUBLIC PLACES OR AIRPORTS/AIRLINES FOR 
THEIR ANIMAL BACKGROUND PAPER 1 (2014), http://sbp.senate.ca.gov/sites/sbp. 
senate.ca.gov/files/Background%20Paper%20for%20Fake%20Service%20Dog%20
Hearing%20(2-14-14).pdf [hereinafter California Senate Hearing Background 
Paper]. 
140. California Senate Hearing Background Paper, supra note 139, at 12. 
Businesses are also concerned about possible liability if a fake service animal causes 
harm because of a lack of training, increased costs, and the loss of business due to 
multiple animals on the premises. Id. at 13.
141. Id. at 12. 
142. Although in theory the general fraud provisions, such as the language 
found in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012) providing for up to five years in prison for 
misrepresentation on matters within the jurisdiction of the United States could be 
applied, the legislative history of that provision does not support that use, and as of 
the writing of this Article in October 2014, electronic searches did not locate any 
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In the absence of a clear federal remedy, several states have 
enacted legislative provisions that make it a criminal offense to 
misrepresent the status of an animal as a service animal.144 Some of 
these statutes focus on the outward appearance of the purported 
service animal.145 Language in these statutes focus on the use of a 
                                                                                                               
federal case utilizing this provision relating to the misrepresentation of a service 
animal. 
143. See generally NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, EQUALITY OF 
OPPORTUNITY: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2010), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150716015124/http://www.ncd.gov/rawmedia_reposi
tory/3c924b70_595f_4d70_b3cc_b3b584503a92?document.pdf; Chai R. Feldblum 
et al., The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 187, 187-91
(2008). 
144. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 365.7 (West 2015) (providing it is a 
misdemeanor to knowingly and fraudulently misrepresent yourself as the owner or 
trainer of a guide, signal, or service dog); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-5811A (West 
2015) (providing that “[a]ny person, not being a disabled person or being trained to 
assist disabled persons . . . us[ing] an assistance device or assistance dog in an 
attempt to gain treatment or benefits as a disabled person, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1313 (West 2015) (providing that the 
unlawful use of a guide dog by an individual who is not blind as defined by law is a 
Class III misdemeanor); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426-805 (West 2015) (providing 
“[i]t is unlawful for a person to fraudulently misrepresent an animal as a service 
animal or service animal in training”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.84.060 (West 
2015) (providing it is unlawful for an individual not disabled to use a service animal 
“for the purpose of securing the rights and privileges” provided by law allowing for 
access for persons with disabilities). The language in the New York Code is not as 
clear, providing that it is unlawful to “affix to any dog any false or improper 
identification tag, special identification tag for identifying guide, service or hearing 
dogs or purebred license tag.” N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 118 (McKinney 2015). 
There are also other laws that provide for sanctions if a person falsely impersonates 
himself or herself as an individual with a disability. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-13-107 (West 2015) (stating that “[a] person shall not falsely impersonate 
an individual with a disability” and providing that doing so is a Petty 1 offense).
145. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1314-A (2015) (providing it is a 
civil violation to fit “a dog with a harness, collar, vest or sign of the type commonly 
used by blind person in order to represent that the dog is a service dog”); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 167-D:8 (2015) (providing it is unlawful to fit an animal with a collar, 
harness, or a tag representing an animal is a service animal if the animal is not and 
thus using the animal to misrepresent the physical status of the handler); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-29.5 (West 2015) (providing a fine if an individual “fits a dog with a 
harness of the type commonly used by blind persons in order to represent that such 
dog is a guide dog when training of the type that guide dogs normally receive has 
not in fact, been provided”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 168-4.5 (West 2015) 
(providing “[i]t is unlawful to disguise an animal as a service animal or service 
animal in training” with violation of the section being a Class 3 misdemeanor); TEX.
HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 121.006 (West 2015) (providing for a fine and community 
service if a “person who uses a service animal with a harness or leash of the type 
commonly used by persons with disabilities who use trained animals, in order to 
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harness, collar, or vest commonly used to designate that a dog is 
acting as a service animal.146 For example, Michigan law provides 
that persons who are not deaf, audibly impaired, or otherwise 
physically limited “shall not use or be in possession of a dog that is 
wearing a blaze orange leash and collar or harness in any public 
place.”147
Other state laws focus on misrepresentations by the individuals 
by word or action.148 An example is legislation enacted by the State 
of Kansas that provides that it is unlawful for any person to 
“represent that such person has a disability for the purpose of 
acquiring an assistance dog unless such person has such 
disability.”149 Due to the limitations on the inquiries that can be 
made, it would seem unlikely that an entity would question an 
individual’s use of a purported service animal unless there are 
serious concerns over behavior of the animal or the human.150
                                                                                                               
represent that his or her animal is a specially trained service animal when training 
has not in fact been provided”). 
146. See sources cited supra note 145. This type of gear is readily available 
online and there are no restrictions on its purchase. See, e.g.,
SERVICEDOGVEST.COM, http://www.servicedogvest.com/?gclid=CIrC59j3mMECF 
WqCMgodciUAZw (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (providing for service dog vests and 
gear). 
147. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.62 (West 2015) (knowing violation of 
this Act is a misdemeanor offense). Note that presumably an individual in public 
with his or her animal in a blaze orange collar (because of its reflective qualities) 
would not be charged unless there were facts indicating a knowing violation of the 
law—this language is still problematic. While perhaps the legislatures using this 
type of language are well-meaning, designating a specific colored collar, harness, or 
leash as indicating an animal is a service animal is not required by the regulations 
implementing the Americans with Disabilities Act.  
148. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 209.204 (West 2015) (providing that the 
definition of “impersonates a person with a disability” includes “representation of a 
dog by word or action as a service dog”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-5b-106 (West 
2015) (providing that an individual is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor if the person 
intentionally falsely represents to another person that an animal is a service animal 
or “intentionally misrepresents a material fact to a health care provider for the 
purpose of obtaining documentation from the health care provider necessary to 
designate an animal as a service animal”).
149. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-1112 (West 2015). The Kansas statute also 
provides it is a class A nonperson misdemeanor for a person to represent that “such 
person has the right to be accompanied by an assistance dog . . . unless such person 
has the right to be accompanied in or upon such place by such dog.” Id.
150. At the time of the writing of this Article in October 2014, searches on 
Westlaw only resulted in one case that referenced a state provision regarding the 
misrepresentation of a service animal being utilized. In a California case, an officer 
at water park prepared a crime report that charged a woman under California Penal 
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The use of service animals by individuals who do not have 
apparent disabilities also can lead to a perception of misuse of 
statutes. An example is the use of service dogs by individuals who 
have had a traumatic brain injury or are currently suffering from 
PTSD.151 In the recent ADA rulemaking, the DOJ acknowledged the 
challenge that entities face in determining whether a dog fits within 
the service animal definition but retained language to reflect the 
inclusive nature of the services provided to disabled individuals by 
service animals.152
Entities do have a remedy if a purported service animal is 
disruptive. The ADA regulations specifically provide that an 
individual can be asked to remove a service animal from the 
                                                                                                               
Code provision § 365.7. Lerma v. Cal. Exposition & State Fair Police, No. 2:12-cv-
1363, 2014 WL 28810, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2014). In the Lerma case, Ms. Lerma 
brought a puppy to a water park, and an officer at the park directed her to remove it 
because he could not determine whether the puppy was a service animal. Id. During 
her deposition, Ms. Lerma admitted that the dog was not individually trained to 
perform any task for her. Id. at *5. The court found that the defendants were 
permitted to deny access to Ms. Lerma’s dog and granted the defendants’ summary 
judgment motion. Id. The relevant public safety offices were contacted to determine 
the status of the charge against Ms. Lerma, and based on the Sacramento county 
court database, there is no disposition indicated for the criminal misdemeanor cited 
in the case, which typically means the police “declined to file” allowing the 
misdemeanor to drop after the passage of 364 days. E-mail from Debra Denslaw, 
Faculty Servs. Librarian & Assoc. Professor of Law Librarianship, Valparaiso Univ. 
Law Sch., to author (Mar. 10, 2015, 12:33 PM CST). 
151. Froling, supra note 79 (listing tasks that a service dog may perform for 
an individual with a psychiatric disability including PTSD). The use of service dogs 
for disabilities such as PTSD is growing. Alma Nunley, Service Dogs for (Some) 
Veterans: Inequality in the Treatment of Disabilities by the Department of Veterans 
Affairs, 17 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 261 (2014) (discussing Veterans Affair 
regulations that allow for reimbursement for expenses for service animals utilized 
for visual, hearing, or substantial mobility impairment but not if a service animal is 
used for an individual with PTSD or other mental health conditions). The 
Department of Veterans Affairs has been hesitant to adopt the theory that service 
dogs should be paired with individuals with PTSD and continues to study the issue. 
Dogs and PTSD, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., http://www.ptsd.va.gov/public/ 
treatment/cope/dogs_and_ptsd.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (reporting that as of 
March 2014, the agency had initiated a study to determine what a dog could do for a 
veteran with PTSD that would qualify the dog as a service animal). Many 
organizations are not waiting for the results of the study and are actively placing 
dogs with veterans. See e.g., Elissa Koehl, Watch Service Dog Calm War Vet’s 
PTSD Reaction, USA TODAY (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.thv11.com/story/news/ 
nation-now/2014/09/16/inspiration-nation-service-dog-calms-ptsd/15729181/ 
(discussing the K9s for Warriors program placing service dogs with individuals with 
PTSD). 
152. Huss, Context, supra note 22, at 1177. 
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premises if the “animal is out of control and the animal’s handler 
does not take effective action to control it.”153 Although this section 
has focused on public access for service animals, the same issues 
apply in housing accommodation under the FHA. Even though the 
same level of individual training is not required under the FHA, it 
has clearly been established that only a reasonable accommodation 
must be made; thus, a dog that is displaying behavior that is out of 
control would likely be able to be excluded from a premises.154
Again, although it is impossible to quantify whether there truly 
has been an increase in the number of people misrepresenting the 
status of their animals, advocates will be forced to deal with this 
perception. Using a pit-bull-terrier-like dog, rather than a breed that 
may be more readily viewed as a service animal, such as a Labrador 
Retriever, may lead to a person with a disability being questioned 
more frequently (even just using the inquiries that the ADA allows in 
addition to others that violate the ADA).155 From the perspective of 
an attorney who is concerned both with ensuring that individuals 
with disabilities using service animals have access and dispelling 
problematic myths relating to pit-bull-terrier-like dogs, it is 
especially important to make certain that any dog involved has the 
necessary training and behavior to meet the standards set by the 
ADA and FHA.  
A common theme among pit-bull-terrier-like dog advocates is 
the importance of having each individual dog be an “ambassador”
for the breed in order to dispel negative perceptions about the breed 
as a whole.156 Because of the likely extra attention an individual 
                                                     
153. 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(b)(1) (2014); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(2).  
154. See, e.g., Woodside Village v. Hertzmark, No. SPH9204-65092, 1993 
WL 268293, at *5-6 (Conn. Super. Ct., June 22, 1993) (providing that a housing 
provider could evict a mentally disabled tenant when the housing provider showed it 
had made reasonable efforts to accommodate the tenant but the tenant did not 
comply with the pet policy). 
155. For example, a former police officer with PTSD utilizing a pit-bull-
terrier-like dog as a service animal was recently asked to leave a restaurant in 
California. Whitney Filloon, Former Cop and His Service Dog Kicked Out of 
Restaurant, EATER (Feb. 23, 2015, 9:48 AM), http://www.eater.com/2015/2/23 
/8089837/former-cop-and-his-service-dog-kicked-out-of-restaurant; Linda Mumma, 
Former Police Officer, Service Dog Asked to Leave Old Sac Restaurant, KCRA
NEWS (Feb. 22, 2015, 2:46 PM), http://www.kcra.com/news/local-news/news-
sacramento/former-police-officer-service-dog-asked-to-leave-old-sac-restaurant/ 
31413216. 
156. See, e.g., The Art of Being a Breed Ambassador, PIT BULL RESCUE 
CENT., http://www.pbrc.net/breedambassador.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (“It is 
important for dog and owner to be a great ambassador team; doing so, will not only 
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using a pit-bull-terrier-like dog as a service or assistance animal will 
receive, it is imperative that an attorney is confident that all the 
factors (status of the individual and dog) support the claim. It seems 
unlikely that if a person misrepresents the status of a Labrador 
Retriever as a service animal (either because of the person’s status or 
the dog’s lack of training), it will reflect on the Labrador Retriever 
breed as a whole. Unfortunately for pit-bull-terrier-like dogs and 
their advocates, any bad behavior (again of the person or the dog), 
can (and likely will) be used by persons who support breed-
discriminatory ordinances to reinforce myths about the breed. 
2. Limitation of Coverage—Service Animals in Training 
The ADA does not cover service animals in training.157
However, all but a few states have enacted legislation to provide for 
individuals with service animals in training to be accommodated in a 
similar manner as service animals being used by a person with a 
disability under at least some circumstances.158
                                                                                                               
improve your relationship with your dog, but also display to the public how 
wonderful this breed truly is.”); Micaela Myers, How to Be a Pit Bull Ambassador,
STUBBYDOG (Jan. 16, 2011), http://stubbydog.org/2011/01/on-being-an-ambassador/ 
(listing ways to be a breed ambassador, including cultivating a well-behaved dog). 
157. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of 
service animal as a dog that has been individually trained); see also Proffer v. 
Columbia Tower, No. 98–CV–1404–K (AJB), 1999 WL 33798637, at *5-7 (S.D. 
Cal. Mar. 4, 1999) (holding that neither the ADA nor FHA apply to service animals 
in training). 
158. See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text (describing ways states 
allow for trainers of service animals to have access to public accommodations). The 
Alaska Code does not include specific language regarding access for service animals 
in training in public accommodations, but it does provide for a violation of criminal 
law if an individual intentionally prevents a person training a service animal from 
access in a public facility under certain circumstances. ALASKA STAT. ANN. 
§ 11.76.133(a) (West 2015). The Kentucky Code provides that a “person” with an 
assistance dog entitled to access “also includes a trainer of an assistance dog,” and 
referencing trainers of assistance dogs should have in their possession identification 
verifying their status as trainers, but there is no other language relating to the 
trainers of assistance dogs having access to public accommodations. KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 258.500(1)-(3), (7) (West 2015). Similarly, the language of the Wyoming 
Code provides that the definition of “service dog” means “a dog which has been or 
is being specially trained to the requirements of a person with a disability,” but the 
Code does not otherwise designate access for a trainer of a service animal. WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 35-13-205(a)(i) (West 2015). At the time of the writing of this Article, 
the Hawaii, South Dakota, and Washington state codes do not appear to contain 
language affording a right of access to public accommodations for trainers of service 
animals. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 347-13(b) (West 2015) (providing general 
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States approach the issue in different ways. Some states have 
provided for access by including service animals in training in the 
definition of service animal,159 or in the provision setting forth the 
right of individuals with disabilities utilizing service animals to gain 
access to public accommodations.160 A state may have a separate 
                                                                                                               
accommodation language); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-23.2 (2015) (providing 
language regarding access for persons with disabilities generally); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70.84.010 (West 2015) (providing public access for persons with 
disabilities); see generally Darcie Magnuson, Note, Service Animals in Training and 
the Law: An Imperfect System, 14 SCHOLAR 987 (2012) (discussing the general issue 
and proposing amendments to federal laws to support access for service animals in 
training and uniformity to the laws). 
159. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 209.200(2) (West 2015) (defining service 
dog as “a dog that is being or has been specially trained”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-
5b-102(3)(a) (West 2015) (including in the definition of service animal any dog that 
“is trained, or is in training”).
160. ALA. CODE § 21-7-4(d) (2015) (providing for persons training service 
animals to have the same rights as persons with disabilities to be accompanied by a 
service animal); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1024(E) (2015) (providing “[a]ny trainer 
or individual with a disability may take an animal being trained as a service animal to a 
public place” to the same extent as individuals with disabilities who use service 
animals); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-14-308(a) (West 2015) (providing that “[a]n 
individual with visual, hearing, or other physical disabilities and his or her guide, 
signal, or service dog or a dog trainer in the act of training a guide, signal, or service 
dog shall not be denied admittance to or refused access to [list of public 
accommodations]”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-44 (West 2015) (allowing access 
for guide and assistance dog trainers); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4504(a) (West 2015) 
(including trainers and their support animals within the definition of persons who 
cannot be denied access to public accommodations); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 413.08(8) 
(West 2015) (providing trainers of service animals while engaged in the training of 
such animals have the same right of access); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/48-8
(West 2015) (providing for “a trainer of a service animal is accompanied by a service 
animal” to have “the right of entry and use” of public accommodations); IND. CODE
ANN. § 16-32-3-2(d) (West 2015) (providing for service animal trainers to be granted 
access to public accommodations); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216C.11(2) (West 2015) 
(including “person[s] training a service dog or an assistive animal” in categories of 
persons who are not to be denied access); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 1312(4) (2015) 
(granting “[a]n especially trained service dog trainer” access “while engaged in the 
actual training process”); MD. CODE ANN., HUM. SERVS. §§ 7-704(a)-(b), 7-705(c)(2) 
(West 2015) (including “service animal trainers who are accompanied by an animal 
being trained or raised as a service animal” to have the same right of access, but 
allowing for the exclusion of animals being trained as service animals “if admitting the 
animal would create a clear danger of a disturbance or physical harm to an individual 
in the place”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256C.02 (West 2015) (including person training a 
service dog); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-6-155(2) (West 2015) (providing “[t]rainers of 
support dogs” with “the same rights of accommodation[]”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 20-127(3) (West 2015) (providing that “a bona fide trainer of a service animal” has 
the same right of access as an individual with a disability); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 651.075(1)(b) (West 2015) (making it unlawful to “[r]efuse admittance . . . to a 
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statutory section that provides for trainers to have the same rights 
and privileges with respect to access as persons with disabilities.161 In 
                                                                                                               
person training a service animal”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-11-2(B), (C) (West 2015) 
(providing in the definition of “qualified service animal” and “qualified service dog” 
an animal “being trained”); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 47-b(3) (McKinney 2015) 
(including persons training a dog “while engaged in such training activities”); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 955.43(A) (West 2015) (including trainers of assistance dogs); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 19.1(A), (B) (West 2014) (including “dog trainer from a 
recognized training center”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.143(1), (6)(a) (West 2015) 
(defining “assistance animal trainee” and trainer and allowing for access to public 
accommodations); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7325 (West 2015) (including a person 
“who is training a [service] dog or other aid animal” in the general provision 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of the use of a service dog); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 43-33-20(d) (2015) (including trainers in the general provision relating to right of use 
of public facilities and public accommodations); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. 
§ 121.003(i) (West 2015) (providing that “[a] service animal in training shall not be 
denied admittance to any public facility when accompanied by an approved trainer”); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502(b) (2015) (providing same access for a service animal 
trainer); VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-44(E) (West 2015) (providing for a person with a dog 
that is in training that is at least six months old to have access so long as the dog and 
trainer are utilizing identifying material, such as a blaze orange leash, harness, or vest); 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-15-4(d) (West 2015) (including “any person who is certified as 
a trainer of a service animal while he or she is engaged in the training”); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 106.52(3)(am)(1)(a) (West 2015) (including “service animal trainer” in 
provision). Montana provides for service animals in training to have access only if 
such animals are wearing written identification legible from a distance of at least 
twenty feet that identifies that the animal is a service animal in training. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 49-4-214(4) (West 2015). Michigan’s statute includes similar language 
requiring the dog in training to be wearing something that identifies the dog as a 
service animal and the individual training the dog to have identification. MICH COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.502c(2) (West 2015); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 168-4.2(b) 
(West 2015) (allowing access for animal in training if the animal is identified, such as 
through a harness or cape, as service animal in training); TENN CODE ANN. § 62-7-
112(2) (West 2015) (providing for access for a dog guide trainer if the trainer provides 
credentials for inspection, the dog is wearing apparel that identifies the dog with the 
school, and the training includes the socialization process). 
161. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-803(2) (West 2015) (providing 
a parallel section allowing for access by “[a] trainer of a service animal[] or an 
individual with a disability accompanied by an animal that is being trained to be a 
service animal”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 56-704A (West 2015) (providing for access for a 
person who is specially training or socializing a dog for the purpose of being an 
assistance dog; however, the person must carry an identification card from a 
recognized organization serving disabled persons); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-1109 (West 
2015) (providing “[a]ny professional trainer[] from a recognized training center . . .
while engaged in the training of such dog” to “have the right to be accompanied by 
such dog”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1955 (2015) (providing “trainer or puppy raiser” 
of a service dog to have access); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 129, § 39F (West 2015) 
(providing “[a] person accompanied by and engaged in the raising or training of a 
service dog . . . shall have the same rights, privileges and responsibilities as those 
1596 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1561 
some jurisdictions, the ability to gain public access with a service 
dog in training may be conditional on the handler’s status (such as 
being associated with an accredited school for training service 
animals) and identification of the dog as being from an accredited 
school.162
Similar to the issue relating to misrepresentation of a service 
animal, an individual who attempts to gain access to a business with 
a service animal in training, without appropriately relying on a state 
law that allows such access, creates problems for all individuals 
using service animals. Even if the individual training the dog is 
merely mistaken in his or her understanding of the limitations of the 
law, such incidents are unacceptable as they can lead to more 
difficulties for individuals with disabilities using service animals in 
the future.163
Without such state law coverage, an individual with a disability 
going through training with a service dog may be restricted in his or 
her access to public accommodations and entities. However, such 
individuals still may be able to successfully argue that the animal is 
covered under the FHA because the focus under that statute is 
                                                                                                               
afforded to an individual with a disability”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167-D:6 (2015) 
(providing “[a] service animal trainer[] while engaged in the actual training process 
and activities of such animals” to have rights of access); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-29.3 
(West 2015) (providing that the trainer must be “engaged in the actual training process 
and activities of service dogs” and has “the same responsibilities as are applicable to a 
person with a disability”); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-9.1-2.1 (West 2015) (allowing 
for a “trainer or puppy raiser” to have the same access as persons with disabilities 
using a personal assistance animal). 
162. CAL. CIV. CODE § 54.2(b) (West 2015) (providing for persons “licensed” 
or “authorized” to train guide, signal, and service dogs to have the same access to 
public accommodations with the dogs that are being trained as individuals with 
disabilities who use service animals); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-4-2(b)(3) (West 2015) 
(providing that trainers of service animals must have credentials from an accredited 
school available for inspection among other requirements); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 25-13-02.1(1) (West 2015) (providing trainers with service animals the right to 
enter public accommodations if the trainer notifies the manager of the premises of 
the status of the animal and “[t]he trainer wears a photo identification card issued by 
a nationally recognized service animal training program”). 
163. E.g., Davis v. Ma, 848 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d, 568 
F. App’x 488 (9th Cir. 2014). In the Ma case, an individual with a back injury 
brought an action against a fast food restaurant for denial of service when the 
individual brought a thirteen-week-old puppy into the establishment and stated that 
the dog was being trained as a service animal. Id. at 1109-10. The Ma court analyzed 
the training of the dog and found it was not a triable issue of fact whether the dog 
met the definition of service animal because it was an uncontroverted fact that the 
dog was not “fully trained as a service animal, and only had some ‘basic obedience’ 
training.” Id. at 1115 (quoting Declaration of Sally Montrucchio at ¶¶ 10, 23).  
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whether the animal alleviates a disability rather than whether the 
animal performs work or tasks in order to assist an individual with a 
disability.164
3. Results of Concerns 
Any time an attorney represents an individual, the attorney 
must do his or her research to ensure that the client has a valid cause 
of action. In the case of service and assistance animals, an attorney 
must ensure that the individual fits within the definition of an 
individual with a disability and that the animal fits within the 
definition of service or assistance animal and is required because of 
the disability. Without careful consideration of these factors, an 
attorney does a disservice to both the disability community and 
animals. An attorney will want to confirm that there is adequate 
documentation as to an individual’s disability and need for a service 
or assistance animal, even if such disability is readily apparent.165
The attorney should also perform his or her due diligence to ensure 
that the dog meets the relevant standard of behavior training given 
the risk that bringing a case in which an individual pit-bull-terrier-
like dog’s inappropriate behavior could be imputed upon the breed as 
a whole. 
                                                     
164. See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text (discussing the 
definition of assistance animal under the FHA). 
165. HUD has issued a notice that states that housing providers “may not ask 
a tenant or applicant to provide documentation showing the disability or disability-
related need for an assistance animal if the disability or disability-related need is 
readily apparent or already known to the provider”; however, case law illustrates 
housing providers sometimes do ask for such documentation. U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOUSING & URB. DEV., SERVICE ANIMALS AND ASSISTANCE ANIMALS FOR PEOPLE 
WITH DISABILITIES IN HOUSING AND HUD-FUNDED PROGRAMS 4 (2013), 
https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=servanimals_ntcfheo2013-
01.pdf; e.g., Sabal Palm Condo. of Pine Island Ridge Ass’n, Inc. v. Fischer, 6 F. 
Supp. 3d 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2014). In this case, a woman with multiple sclerosis and 
confined to a wheelchair was asked to “produce copies of her medical records from 
all of her healthcare providers who diagnosed or treated the disability that she 
claimed made a service dog necessary” and provide “all documents relating to the 
nature, size and species of dog, as well as all documents regarding any training it 
received.” Id. at 1276 (quoting Electronic Case Files No. 82–2 at 2). The Sabal Palm
court did not appear impressed with the response of the condominium association 
stating that the fact that the condominium association “turned to the courts to resolve 
what should have been an easy decision is a sad commentary on the litigious nature 
of our society.” Id. at 1275.  
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B. Theoretical Concerns 
It is now clear that advocates can utilize the protections 
provided by the ADA and FHA to address access issues for 
individuals with disabilities who utilize pit-bull-terrier-like dogs as 
service or assistance animals. However, animal advocates need to 
consider whether this is the best use of their efforts or if, in fact, this 
will actually work to the long-term detriment of animals.  
An abolitionist approach would view this type of campaign as 
reinforcing the property status of animals because of the necessary 
focus on the role the dog plays in the life of the person with the 
disability. Essentially, it is only because of the status of the 
individual as a person with a disability that the dog is treated any 
differently. A welfarist would consider whether the animal is 
actually being treated humanely. A welfarist might focus on the 
possible benefits to other pit-bull-terrier-like dogs if persons using 
these animals are given access. Specifically, does the use of pit-bull-
terrier-like dogs as service or assistance animals assist in dispelling 
the negative myths associated with breed?  
CONCLUSION
The reality is that persons with disabilities are already using 
pit-bull-terrier-like dogs as service and assistance animals. 
Supporting the appropriate use of pit-bull-terrier-like dogs as service 
and assistance animals, while working to combat the inappropriate 
use of laws protecting persons with disabilities can, at a minimum, 
improve the lives of those individuals and their dogs. In the author’s
opinion, animal advocates should not abandon the goal of changing 
the status of animals as just another form of personal property. In the 
interim period, it is important to use the tools available to change the 
lives of individual animals and their human companions, while 
ensuring that any dog utilized as a service or assistance animal is 
being treated in a way consistent with the dog’s best interests. In 
addition, for persons who have yet to be educated about the necessity 
of judging a dog based on the dog’s individual behavior rather than 
appearance, the careful use of “good facts” cases could assist in 
improving the perception of pit-bull-terrier-like dogs. This is another 
step that can be taken to confront the problem of breed-
discriminatory legislation. 
